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This thesis will examine challenges defense department managers face
when implementing the cost as an independent variable (CAIV) concept of cost
control. The CAIV concept replaces the design-to-cost (DTC) concept which only
achieved limited success. Emphasis is placed on identifying issues that managers
faced implementing the DTC concept. These issues are analyzed to determine the
potential cause of the issue and the impact the issue may have on programs
r
implementing CAIV.
It is the contention of this thesis that the CAIV concept and the DTC
concept are in theory, virtually identical. Many of the same issues will surface
during CAIV implementation that managers faced implementing DTC. CAIV may
become another ineffective cost control measure. However, DTC was not usually
implemented as intended by the guidance. In addition, acquisition reform has
provided the manager implementing the CAIV concept significant advantages over
previous managers. With full management support, programs implementing the
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The declining defense budget and the end of the Cold War have caused the
Department of Defense (DOD) to place a renewed emphasis on cost control. The
priority that top DOD leadership places on cost reduction is emphasized by the Under
Secretary of Defense Paul Kaminski in the 1995 memorandum entitled, "Reducing
Life Cycle Costs for New and Fielded Systems." Kaminski stated, "Reducing the
cost to acquire and operate the Department's equipment while maintaining a high
level of performance for the user is my highest priority." [Ref. 1: p. 1]
Over the years, the DOD has implemented a number of programs with the
objective to better manage and/or reduce acquisition costs, including design-to-price,
design-to-cost (DTC), design-to-life-cycle cost (DTLCC), value engineering, and
Program Baseline agreements. These programs have resulted in some degree of cost
control. However, costs generally have increased, resulting once again in the Military
Departments and Services facing budget shortfalls.
Further evidence of the importance of life cycle cost can be seen from the
emphasis placed on cost control in the update of the DOD 5000 series documents.
One of the six major themes, described in DOD 5000.1 and DOD 5000.2-R, that
define the new acquisition environment is cost as an independent variable (CATV).
Program managers must use the CATV approach throughout the acquisition lifecycle.
B. OBJECTIVES AND BENEFITS
This thesis will benefit program managers throughout the DOD by explaining
the concept of CAIV and developing recommendations to overcome implementation
issues. The concept ofCATV must be included as part of the development process, yet
has not been fully explained in available documents. Unlike past initiatives,
comprehensive directives or guides are not included as part of the implementation
process guidance. The concept of CATV is not fully understood by many within the
acquisition process.
The CATV concept is described as a new approach to cost control based on
industry practices. In the preface to a 1995 CATV Working Group Paper, the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition & Technology, R. Noel Longuemare
stated:
For years the non-defense sector has successfully developed and
produced high quality products that fully meet or exceed customer
needs, while also meeting specific, predetermined cost targets for
these products. The thrust of CAIV adapts these successful practices
to meet DOD needs. [Ref. 2]
Kaminski similarly declares, "CAIV is the DOD equivalent of best commercial
business practices." [Ref. l:p. 1] It appears successful CATV implementation could be
achieved by studying industry methods.
The comparison of a DOD cost control program to non-defense commercial or
industry practices is not new. The earlier DTC concept was compared to existing
commercial practices. In 1974, an article providing a DTC overview in a special DTC
issue of the Defense Management Journal stated:
To industry, design to cost is not a new concept. It has been used by
many manufacturers of commercial products, ranging from radios to
automobiles. Managers and engineers in commercial industry are
generally well aware of the production item cost target which must be
achieved if the product is to be competitive. [Ref. 3:p. 3]
There are many other references to commercial practices. The keynote speaker for the
1976 DTC Conference was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material
Acquisition), Jacques Gansler. He described the relationship in his opening comments
by stating, "design-to-cost principles encompass the application of relatively common
sense commercial practice to DOD systems acquisition." [Ref. 4:p. 1]
Although there are a number of DTC success stories, the DTC program never
achieved widespread success as a cost control program. In 1995 the DTC military
standard was canceled and CATV became the new cost control concept.
The primary goal of this research is to identify CATV implementation issues
and develop recommendations to address the issues. The research will examine the
DTC program implementation process to identify similarities to the CATV concept.
This part of the research will form the basis for the analysis by developing issues that
must be resolved before the Services can implement CAJV. Recommendations will be
developed to address CAJV issues.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question this thesis seeks to answer is:
• What challenges will be faced by the Services in implementing the
CATV concept on new systems?
The following subsidiary questions also will be addressed:
• What is the difference between CATV and the DTC program required
in the past to control and manage program costs?
• What advantage does the CATV concept outlined in the updated DOD
5000 series documents offer the Services?
• What systems can be used as benchmarks for CATV implementation?
• What issues will program managers face in implementing CATV?
• What recommendations can be offered to program managers to best
address problematic CATV issues?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The concept of CATV is one of considerable breadth. The CATV Working
Group identified the following steps that may be used to achieve CATV objectives:
1) Set realistic but aggressive cost objectives early in each acquisition
program
2) Manage risks to achieve cost, schedule, and performance objectives
3) Devise appropriate metrics for tracking progress in setting and achieving
cost objectives
4) Motivate and incentivize government and industry managers to achieve
program objectives
5) Put in place for fielded systems additional incentives to reduce operating
and support costs [Ref. 5:p. 2]
This research focuses on the first step, the establishment of cost objectives, and the
fourth step, motivating and incentivizing managers to achieve objectives. The other
steps are considered beyond the scope of this thesis and are suggested as potential
areas for further study.
In addition, the thesis will concentrate on CATV as it applies to hardware
acquisition and will not specifically address contracting for services. The thesis will
reference existing CATV implementation on current systems but will not attempt a
detailed case analysis of any particular program.
E. METHODOLOGY
1. Overview
The following steps will be used to collect and analyze data:
• Identify past cost control programs
• Describe the DTC program
• Develop and analyze DTC cost control issues
• Examine the CAIV cost control initiative
• Identify commercial cost goal establishment procedures
• Develop interview questions
• Conduct interviews
• Identify implementation issues facing program managers
• Develop recommendations
2. Data Collection
The data collection effort uses two methods to obtain information: literature
review and structured interviews.
The literature review will focus on identifying key elements of past cost control
programs, and examining the CAIV concept. The data will be collected from a variety
of sources including magazine and journal articles, books, the internet, briefings,
reports, regulations, manuals, and conference proceedings. Case studies from past
DTC programs also will be examined to develop issues and recommendations.
Interviews were conducted either in person or by telephone. Representatives
from the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and Project Offices
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will be contacted. Specific questions will be tailored to the backgrounds, of the
individuals or organizations and will be identified in subsequent sections of the thesis.
The interviews will be intended to supplement the literature review.
3. Data Analysis
The analysis of the data will focus on identifying similarities between the DTC
program and CAIV, identifying issues that program managers will face implementing
CAIV and developing recommendations to assist program managers in implementing
CAIV.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis will consist of five chapters. The content of the remaining chapters
is described below.
Chapter II — DOD Cost Control Background ~ A history of cost control
initiatives and programs, and a description of the DTC program.
Chapter HI — Cost as an Independent Variable — Analysis of the CATV concept
as outlined in DOD 5000 documents, studies prepared by the CATV Working Group
further defining CAIV, and upper management direction/policies regarding CATV.
Key elements ofCAIV are described and compared to DTC.
Chapter IV — Analysis of Data ~ Data analysis to provide a comparison of
DTC and CATV. Issues will be identified that program managers face implementing
CAIV.
Chapter V ~ Conclusions and Recommendations — A summary of the results
of analyses in previous chapters, provision of answers to the research questions and
recommendations for the Services to consider when implementing CATV.

II. DOD COST CONTROL BACKGROUND
A. OVERVIEW
The need for cost control is a continuing issue facing the DOD. Over the past
twenty-five years design-to-cost (DTC) was the primary cost control program that
DOD implemented. The DTC program was revised many times. This chapter will
focus on providing a history of DTC, and describing key elements of the DTC
program.
B. HISTORY OF DTC
In one of the earliest statements mentioning a "design-to" cost control policy,
Dr. John Foster, Jr., the Director of Defense Research and Engineering stated in
March 1970:
We shall insist relentlessly ~ as a point without peer in our management
— that price has as much priority as performance....We must design-to-
a-price, a much lower price, or else we will not be able to afford what
we need. Defense budgets are going down. The costs of what we need
are going up, just our essential needs, are going up. Our only solution is
to make cost a principal design parameter. That is how we must now
define what is "best". We have no other choice. [Ref. 6]
Dr. Foster is generally credited with establishing the "design-to" concept within DOD.
The problems facing the DOD in 1970 appear similar to problems facing DOD
today. Weapon system costs were increasing and the budget was decreasing. Dr.
Foster's policy was formally implemented the following year in the release of DOD
Directive 5000.1.
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The DOD Directive 5000.1 released on 13 July 1971 addressed cost in the
following paragraph:
Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of
acquisition and ownership; discrete cost elements (e.g., unit production
cost, operating and support cost) shall be translated into "design-to"
requirements. System development shall be continuously evaluated
against these requirements with the same rigor as that applied to
technical requirements. Practical tradeoffs shall be made between
system capability, cost and schedule. Traceabihty of estimates and
costing factors, including those for economic escalation, shall be
maintained. [Ref. 7]
This Directive officially established DTC as a new acquisition approach and required
implementation within 90 days. The Services were left to develop their own policies
regarding implementation, and an implementation guide was not published for over
two years.
Early guidance specifically addressed both the cost of producing a system and
the cost of operating and supporting the system. Ownership costs were known to
represent a major portion a weapon systems costs.
On 16 August 1972, Dr. John Foster, Jr. addressed an Armed Forces
Management Association/National Security Industrial Association Cost Symposium.
Dr. Foster described the new policies established by DOD 5000.1. The key to
successful implementation was to gain an understanding of the differences between the
old acquisition concepts and the new concept. The following policies were
implemented by the new DOD 5000. 1 [Ref. 7]:
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Reducing concurrency
Designing to cost requirements
Using prototypes
Requiring hardware competition
Reducing radically the size of industry design teams
Minimizing the number of detailed weapon system requirements
Increasing independent OT&E prior to the procurement decision
j
A number of these policies placed an additional burden on research, development, test
& evaluation (RDTE) funding. Prototypes, hardware competition and increased
OT&E prior to the production decision required additional RDTE funds but were
expected to result in net savings in the later phases of the program.
Dr. Foster's address also highlighted the DOD position on Cost and
performance tradeoffs. He stated:
We are willing to take the radical step of ordering into production a
less capable piece of equipment — compared one-for-one with an
alternative system — if we can get substantially greater numbers and
therefore, increased total combat strength....Within our fiscal
constraints, what is really best is the right combination of individual
quality and sufficient numbers. And so our objective is the "best" in
this broader context...not individually best. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
Dr. Foster's message was not usually put into practice. In most cases performance was
still the most important criterion for development of a weapon system. Many systems
attempted to obtain the last 10% gain in performance even if it meant substantially
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raising the cost of the product. Rather than trade for higher quantities of a less capable
weapon, quantities were reduced to produce fewer than the desired quantity. This
factor is one of the issues discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
A number of other memorandums and briefings provided initial guidance in
setting up the DTC program. Support contractors also prepared reports on the subject
in response to DOD requests. The Services attempted to implement DTC but specific
implementation procedures were lacking. Cost goals were established for major
programs with different ground rules and assumptions.
The first official implementation guide, the Joint Design-to-Cost Guide was
released on 3 October 1973 by the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air
Force. Originally, Dr. Foster addressed the "design-to" concept using the word price
rather than cost. The term price inferred total life cycle cost. The DOD 5000. 1 also
addressed both the production and the operating and support (O&S) costs. The new
guide recognized the importance ofO&S costs but placed emphasis on unit production
costs. The official definition of design-to-cost included only production cost elements.
The guide defined design-to-cost in the following manner:
Design to Cost is a process utilizing unit cost goals as thresholds for
managers and as design parameters for engineers. A single cumulative
"average unit flyaway cost" goal is approved by [the] DSARC for the
program. This goal is then broken down into unit production cost goals
by the program manager and provided to each contractor or inhouse
source for the appropriate major subsystem. [Ref 9:p. 4]
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The guide did address life cycle costs by stating that O&S costs should be
included as part of the design-to requirements. However, the goal for both the
government and contractor managers included only production costs. If the goal
includes only production cost elements, then the emphasis will be on achieving the
production cost goal, not on minimizing life cycle cost. Centering cost control efforts
on the near term costs at the expense ofO&S costs is discussed in Chapter IV.
Although the Joint DTC Guide was updated a number of times in the 1970's,
the emphasis on production costs remained. Later versions did provide requirements
and guidance in establishing cost goals for O&S cost drivers.
The DOD Directive for DTC was also released and updated. Two different
versions of military standards (MIL STD) for DTC were developed for incorporation
into contracts. Individual organizations within the Services also published guidance
for use in implementing DTC.
A different definition ofDTC is provided by Military Handbook (MIL HDBK)
766. This definition removes specific mention of the costs of different phases.
However cost is defined as lifecycle cost. The MIL HDBK 766 defines DTC as:
An acquisition management cost control technique established to
achieve defense systems designs that meet stated cost requirements.
Cost is a design requirement addressed on a continuing basis as part of a
system's development process. The technique embodies early
establishment of realistic but rigorous cost objectives, goals, or targets
and a determined effort to achieve them. [Ref. 10:p. 7]
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This is the definition of DTC that is used during the remainder of this thesis. The
concept appears relatively simple: cost is considered as a design requirement, the same
as performance. The actual implementation proved difficult and the DTC program
ended with the cancellation of the military standard in 1995.
C. KEY ELEMENTS OF DTC
DOD relied on the DTC program to manage costs. Successful implementation
ofDTC required the Services be able to address a number of different questions. The
following questions are discussed:
• How are DTC targets/goals developed?
• When are targets and goals implemented?
• How are goals incorporated into contracts?
• What incentives are used to motivate government and contractor
management?
• How is the status of a DTC program monitored?
• What happens when a program is projected not to meet the cost goal?
• How does the DTC goal relate to the budget?
• What organizations are involved in the DTC process?
1. How Are Targets/Goals Developed?
Setting realistic cost ceilings was one of the elements of DTC implementation
addressed by Dr. Foster during his speech at the cost symposium mentioned earlier.
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There is very little guidance in the later documentation relating to the establishment of
cost goals. Four approaches were presented for use in determining cost ceilings by Dr.
Foster:
1) We could estimate the money available for a new system,
divide by the estimated numbers needed, and thereby derive the total
cost per copy. That is an important approach, but the techniques to
do it well are not fully in hand.
2) We could relate the cost ceiling to the actual costs of
related existing systems. For instance, we have put the lightweight
fighter cost ceiling in between the cost of the F-5E International
Fighter and the F-15 Fighter, since its performance goals fall in
between those two. So we estimate what a required performance
should cost and, if it appears low enough to provide adequate
numbers, we can use that figure as the cost ceiling.
3) We could simply set the cost for the new system at the
cost of the systems it is to replace. For instance, we could peg the
Agile missile cost equal to that of the present Sidewinder. With this
approach, the designers are challenged to use technology to get
improved performance at a reduced cost; a downward cost pressure
which matches the upward push of inflation. I strongly support the
thesis that technology can be harnessed to reduce costs. Look at the
size and cost of your transistor radio; it's less costly than the vacuum
tube radios of 25 years ago — in spite of inflation. As we push
technology to reduce unit production costs and lifetime operating
costs, research and development expenditures will have to rise, but
over the long pull total defense expenditures will be better
controlled.
4) Where it is impossible to find a formula for a realistic and
logical cost ceiling for a new system, we will have to use judgment
to pick a best figure and then iteratively adjust the figure as we start
and test some designs. [Ref. 8:p. 4]
Setting cost goals is one of the most important steps in the process. These four
approaches outlined methods to establish a cost goal. Each of the four approaches has
some advantages and disadvantages.
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The first approach requires the cost estimator to know with certainty the
budgets that would be available in the future in order to develop a cost goal. It must be
remembered, that the initial DTC policies covered not only production costs but O&S
costs. Since the production and operation of the weapon system spanned many more
years than available in the budget documentation, this approach was not feasible.
The second approach could be used but, does not achieve the full benefits of
the DTC concept. One of the reasons for implementing DTC was to reduce the
increasing costs of weapon systems. By setting cost goals based on these weapon
systems, the target may be based on a system that was too costly. The old system was
not subject to cost/performance tradeoffs during the development cycle. In this case,
performance may end up being traded off for cost since performance is lower than for
the previous system. In most cases, performance will be increased beyond the
capabilities of the current system and no previous upper bound will exist.
The third approach may have the biggest impact on reducing costs by setting
cost goals that require a change or improvement to the existing methods used to
produce a system. The problem with this approach, discussed later, is that in most
cases improved technology required additional costs, both for the hardware and the
facilities to produce the hardware. The end result is that costs increased.
The fourth approach may be the best approach since early in concept
development there are too many unknowns to place a point estimate on production
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or life cycle cost. An iterative approach allows a contractor to develop a system
that is in the "ball park" and then to set a specific target once technology and
capabilities are known.
The issue of setting point estimates and setting cost goals early in a
development program for high technology programs is also discussed in Chapter
IV. Cost goals are based on the entire projected buy and on the quantity profile in
place at the moment.
....
2. When Are Targets/Goals Implemented?
Cost goals are required as part of the milestone process. Every new system
must establish a cost goal as part of the requirements definition process. During the
concept exploration phase, major configuration decisions are made to define the
program. Costs are determined for the various alternative design approaches. At this
stage of program development the cost goal may be specified as a range rather than a
point estimate. It is well known that design and configuration decisions made early in
the program generally influence cost to a greater extent than decisions made later in
the program. [Ref.ll] Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the stage of
development of a system and the percent of life cycle cost that has already been
committed due to design decisions.
Early in the program, the least amount of information is available to use as a
basis for design decisions, yet the impact on overall cost is the greatest. The
17
importance of early emphasis on cost control in the decision process is discussed
further in Chapter IV.
END OF DEVELOPMENT 95%
END OF SYSTEM DEFINITION 85%
END OF CONCEPT STUDIES 70%
SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
YEARS
Figure 2.1 Schedule of Decisions Affecting LCC [Ref. ll:p. 31]
Cost goals are updated at each milestone until a firm system goal can be
established prior to the milestone II review. At this point, the decision process usually
selects a concept from a number of alternatives. Each concept will have different
performance and cost characteristics. The importance of this selection is highhghted
in Figure 2. 1 showing that over 85% of the life cycle costs are committed by this
milestone decision.
During the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, the
production unit cost goal is stated as a point estimate based on procuring a fixed
quantity of hardware over a given time period. The goal usually includes the entire
quantity that is expected to be procured. The goal should be stated to ensure that both
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government and contractor can easily understand the elements included. Cost goals
for O&S cost drivers are also specified at this time.
3. How Are Goals Incorporated Into Contracts?
The program manager must, "define design to cost targets in terms which are
auditable, contractually enforceable, and meaningful to both contractor and
government." [Ref. 9:p. 40]. Cost goals can be specified by the government in the
Request for Proposal (RFP) or can be proposed by the contractor during the bid
process.
In the concept exploration phase, often goals or targets are specified but are not
included as part of the contract. There are too many unknowns at this point to make a
cost goal contractually binding. This phase should generate sufficient data to allow a
goal to be developed for the next phase.
The program definition and risk reduction (PDRR) phase should contractually
include a design to cost target, along with acceptable performance levels and a
projected schedule. The RFP also must state the relative importance of the various
design factors for source selection purposes. The importance placed on the current
contract cost and the projected production unit cost goals during the proposal
evaluation process is discussed in Chapter IV. Along with the cost target the contract
should specify the management plan, cost drivers, trade studies, cost elements/factors,
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reporting requirements, data requirements, minimum essential performance
requirements and planned cost reviews. [Ref. 9:p. 38]
The EMD phase should include the items specified above and also include cost
targets for O&S cost elements. The question of how to emphasize O&S cost goals in
contracts also is discussed further in later chapters.
The contractor should address the following areas to be evaluated by
government personnel during the source selection process when responding to an RFP:
Design balance - The contractor must describe how they will balance the
program's performance requirements, cost, production rates, supportability elements
and schedule.
Cost databases/models - The contractor must provide supporting rational for
cost estimates.
Flexible requirements - The contractor must provide recommendations to
government on how to structure requirements to encourage technological innovations,
and present opportunities for trades. In addition, the contractor should identify
nonessential specifications and requirements.
Risk - The contractor must identify high risk areas that may impact cost.
Ranking - The contractor should rank the program's design parameters for the
purpose evaluating tradeoffs.
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Trade studies - The contractor should conduct trade studies on the top ten cost
drivers and provide alternative solutions.
Compatibility - The contractor should provide data to assure the compatibility
of the proposed system, equipment and facilities.
Latitude - The amount of latitude provided the contractor is influenced by the
degree of risk, performance requirements and schedule. The contractor should
recommend the degree of latitude they require and provide justification to support the
recommended level.
DTC requirement factors - The contractor must identify the impact quantities,
rates, time periods, award/incentive fees and the deployment concept have on the cost
goal. [Ref. 10:p. 36]
4. What Incentives Are Used To Motivate Managers?
Two main types of incentives can be used to motivate contractors to achieve
cost goals. The greatest incentive appears to be the use of competition in the
development process. [Ref. 10:p. 32] Although carrying two or more contractors
through all the phases of development substantially increases RDT&E costs, the
expected savings in production and O&S dollars should produce a lower life cycle
cost. When competition is maintained throughout the development program, other
DTC incentives may not prove effective. The amount of future business that may be
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impacted by competition is far greater than the amount of revenue that can be gained
from a monetary incentive.
An award fee is usually established as part of the EMD contract. The award is
based on the ability of the contractor to achieve production unit cost goals and/or O&S
cost goals. The fee is paid only after achievement of the goal is actually demonstrated,
and it is usually paid a number of years after the completion of FSD. The amount of
the fee is limited to 15% of the amount of the development contract. Higher fees can
be specified by requesting a waiver to policy. A fee of3% to 12% of the development
contract is the normal range. [Ref. 10:p. 33]
Government managers have powerful incentives to achieve or exceed cost
goals. The threat of program cancellation is one of the biggest incentives for
government managers. Chapter IV will discuss some of the problems encountered by
government managers in establishing and managing to achieve cost goals.
5. How Is Program Status Monitored?
Cost goals are specified in government program management documentation
forwarded to higher headquarters. Among the documents that contain cost goals are
the acquisition program baseline (APB) document, selected acquisition report (SAR),
and the decision coordinating paper (DCP). Contractor progress is monitored by
periodic progress reviews, review of specific reports, and data specified in the contract.
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6. What Happens When A Program Cannot Achieve A Cost Goal?
The contractor should continually make tradeoffs to ensure that the cost goal is
attained. After exhausting tradeoff possibilities, if the contractor still cannot achieve
the goal, the government has two choices. The government can either terminate the
program or continue the program realizing that production and/or O&S costs will be
higher than anticipated. Contractor cost goals are generally not increased unless the
cost increase is caused by the addition of requirements or other government initiated
fluctuations to the baseline. The entire subject area relating to the failure to achieve
cost goals will be discussed in chapter 4.
7. How Does The Cost Goal Relate To The Budget?
There are no specific instructions for program managers to relate the
contractual DTC goals to their budgets. In the early stages of development of the DTC
concept the intent was for the DTC goal to represent the contractor's portion of the
production costs and was directly related to the budget. [Ref. 8:p. 2] The failure over
the years of the contract to achieve DTC goals has led government managers to
include significant risk funding above the level required if the DTC goal was realized.
The DTC goal is calculated based on the entire projected buy. At the time of
establishment of the DTC goal, the total quantities and the yearly quantities used to
calculate the goal match the budgeted quantities. Since budgets fluctuate almost every
year, the yearly quantity assumptions used to calculate the DTC goal usually do not
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match the budget at the end of a particular phase of a program. The DTC goal
specified in the contract is not updated every time the budget changes but, the
contractor should provide sufficient data to allow a projection to be made to update the
original goal using the new budget and quantity assumptions.
8. What Organizations Are Involved In The DTC Process?
The DTC process involves program managers, contractor personnel, the user,
cost group personnel and contracting personnel.
The user is involved early in the process during the concept formulation.
However, once a program manager is selected, usually by the time a program reaches
milestone I, user involvement is over. [Ref. 9:p. 22] The user may become involved
at a later point if the contractor projects a significant overrun to the goal. At this point
the program is reviewed by higher headquarters for continuation and the user might be
requested to lower requirements. In practice, the user remains involved throughout the
development and production phases. However, the focus of the involvement is not on
the cost/performance tradeoff process.
The government program manager must monitor the contractor DTC program,
report progress to higher headquarters, and approve and/or recommend tradeoffs
between cost, schedule and performance. The contractor implements the DTC
program according to the contract and the specific management plan. The local
command provides contracting and cost analysis for implementation and review of the
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DTC program. Higher headquarters personnel review government program manager
and contractor reports and also may require government program reviews that analyze
DTC progress.
D. SUMMARY
Key aspects of the DTC implementation process were analyzed for comparison
to the current cost control policy. The DTC program evolved over a 25 year
implementation period. However, the overall results anticipated were not achieved.
Chapter IV will analyze in detail some of the issues introduced in this chapter. Areas
considered key to understanding the DTC concept are the goal setting process, cost
goal/target tracking, cost elements, incentives, relationship to the budget,
contractual factors, and characteristics and responsibilities of organizations.
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III. COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
A. OVERVIEW
As part of the reform process the Department of Defense 5000 series
documents have been updated. There are two new documents, one containing
mandatory rules, DOD 5000.2-R and the other, DOD 5000.1, containing general
guidelines. Fewer mandatory requirements are specified in the new DOD 5000. 1 than
in the previous DOD 5000 series documents. In theory, this allows managers more
flexibility to manage programs.





Cost as an Independent Variable
Commercial Products
Best Practices
The themes are blended into the documents but are not clearly defined in a manner
that makes them usable to most program managers or contract officers. The new DOD
documents present the theme but leave implementation issues to individual offices and
27
programs. Further information on some of the themes may be obtained from DOD
sponsored working groups but, little has been published to date on the Cost as an
Independent Variable (CATV) concept. Most published information is not as specific
as the implementation information contained in older DOD documents.
This chapter will focus on one of the major themes, CATV. The history and
key elements ofCA1Y will be discussed.
B. HISTORY OF CAIV
In a 19 July 1995 Memorandum to all the Military Departments, "Policy on
Cost-Performance Trade-offs," the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, Paul Kaminski introduced the concept of CATV to the DOD community.
In the memorandum he stated:
I am committed to establishing a process whereby cost is an
independent variable in programmatic decisions, and cost goals are
set in each phase. I believe this process will allow us to provide the
most performance for an affordable cost. The overall result will be
to increase the effectiveness of our forces while remaining within the
bounds of our resources. [Ref. 12:p. 1]
Implementation of the policy was made mandatory for all ACAT ID programs and
encouraged for all other programs. Each Service was requested to designate two
ACAT ID programs to serve as demonstration programs and to provide feedback
showing the effectiveness of the CATV approach to acquisition. [Ref. 12:p. 1]
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The new DOD 5000.2-R requires that CATV be addressed in all program
acquisition strategy. The CATV process is specified in Part 3, paragraph 3.3.3 as
follows:
The acquisition strategy shall address methodologies to acquire and
operate affordable DOD systems by setting aggressive, achievable
cost objectives and managing achievement of these objectives. Cost
objectives shall be set to balance mission needs with projected
outyear resources, taking into account anticipated process
improvements in both DOD and defense industries. [Ref. 13,Part
3:p. 6]
Subparagraphs discuss cost/performance tradeoffs and cost management incentives.
Cost/performance tradeoffs are conducted prior to the finalization of an
acquisition strategy. Tradeoffs on programs designated ACAT I shall involve a
cost/performance integrated product team (CPIPT) and include user representation.
The tradeoffs should result in the establishment of a life cycle cost objective at
Milestone I. The flexibility given to the project manager and contractor to perform
cost/performance tradeoffs is considered essential to achieving cost objectives. This
factor is highlighted by the following direction provided by DOD 5000-2.R:
...the number of threshold items in requirements documents and
acquisition program baselines shall be strictly limited, the threshold
values shall represent true minimums, and requirements shall be
stated in terms of capabilities, rather than technical solutions and
specifications. [Request for proposals] RFPs shall include a strict
minimum number of critical performance criteria that will allow
industry maximum flexibility to meet overall program objectives.
[Ref. 13, Part 3 :p. 7]
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The trade-offs between schedule, performance and cost are key elements of the
CATV process. Cost is defined as total life cycle cost. Unlike previous cost control
programs, schedule and performance are now considered functions of cost. Previously
performance was usually the critical design criterion and cost became an outcome or
result of the design. [Ref. 14:p. 3]
A few of memoranda and the new DOD 5000 series documents provided the
early guidance describing the implementation CATV process. A CATV Working
Group formed by Kaminski prepared an Implementation Guidance paper. The paper
focused on what needs to be done and not on how to do it. For example, the guidance
states, "ensure that RFPs and contracts require contractors to develop and implement a
management approach for achieving cost objectives." [Ref. 15 :p. 1] The problem
today, as with past cost control programs is how to answer the "how to"
implementation questions. From the paper emerged the general ideas of CATV.
However, a specific definition and implementation guidelines for program managers
were left out.
During the same time period, the CATV Working Group also prepared
additional guidance that outlined the CATV approach to weapon systems acquisition.
The steps the CATV Working Group outlined to achieve CATV objectives were listed
in Chapter I. The steps in the process include:
• Setting realistic but aggressive cost objectives
early in the acquisition program
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• Managing risks to achieve cost, schedule and
performance objectives
• Devising appropriate metrics for tracking
progress in setting and achieving cost objectives
• Motivating government and industry managers
to achieve program objectives
• Putting in place for fielded systems additional
incentives to reduce operating and support costs
[Ref. 5]
The CAIV Working Group guidance relating to risk management and metrics
are discussed later in this section. The thesis focuses on the other areas.
The CAIV Working Group guidance provides answers to some of the CAIV
"how to" type questions. The paper also describes the activities of the CPIPT. The
CAIV Working Group paper describes three main activities performed by the CPIPT.
[Ref. 5]
The first activity that involves the CPIPT is the cost/performance tradeoff
process. The cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) is used to perform
the cost/performance tradeoffs. In the past, the COEA was used to perform tradeoffs
at the system level and sometimes at component levels if different technologies were
present. Using the COEA to perform design tradeoffs that can actually model impacts
of all the operational requirements document (ORD) or baseline performance and
operational characteristics at component levels will require an expansion of the
capabilities of the existing COEA software models.
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The CPIPT also assists in setting program cost goals. Currently, program
offices prepare an acquisition program baseline (APB) that contains cost goals and
thresholds for the development and procurement phases of a program. At least for
major programs, OSD already assists in setting these goals. The major programs are
approved by OSD during milestone reviews and the approved cost profile usually
becomes the program APB cost goal. The CPIPT involves OSD earlier in the
establishment of the goal. This is intended to save time during the milestone review
process if the cost profiles are already agreed to by an empowered OSD CAIG
representative.
The third activity of the CPIPT is to recommend and approve design and
engineering changes that do not impact required performance. This is an activity that
the project manager is already chartered to perform. Design changes are frequently
made in both development and production programs. The project manager usually
works directly with the user to enact these changes. The CPIPT is supposed to focus
on design changes to reduce development, procurement and support costs.
The CATV working group outlined a risk management approach. The working
group stated that contractor use of mature processes should be a significant factor in
source selections. Many times source selections choose the contractor that proposes
the greatest technological breakthrough, vice the one proposing the least risk. The
working group prepared a table of factors and indicators that can be used to determine
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progress in managing risks. The ability of a program to demonstrate the factors, is
intended to help measure the amount of risk in a program. By examining these factors,
a program manager can better decide where cost/performance tradeoffs are necessary.
Table 3.1 lists the factors and indicators proposed by the working group:
FACTOR INDICATOR
- Design Simplification - Mission simulation complete
- 80% solution analysis complete
- Mature Manufacturing
Processes
- Scaleable process demonstrated
- Technology - Product available
- Market prices established
- Effective Integration -100% 3-D product model exists










- Low cost business processes
employed
Table 3.1 Risk Factors and Indicators [Ref. 5]
In the past, risk management was a part of the weapon system acquisition
process. However, it focused on managing technical or performance risk. Cost risk
management must now take on equal or greater importance than technical risk
management. Cost/performance tradeoffs must be continually performed throughout
the acquisition process and not just used to support milestone decisions.
The Working Group outlined metrics and observables that Program Managers
can use to monitor and assess CAIV progress. The suggested metrics and observables
are listed in Table 3.2.
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METRICS OBSERVABLES




- Outyear resources identified?
- Production and O&S cost
objectives in RFP?
- Key tradeoff issues addressed?
- Is DOD managing to
achieve cost
objectives?
- RFP contains minimum number
of performance specifications?
- CPIPT functioning?
- Tradeoff space identified?
- Risk plan?
- Incentives in RFP and contract?
- Mechanisms for contractor cost
savings suggestions?
- Cost objectives allocated to IPTs
and suppliers?
- Reliability and maintainability
estimated/measured?
- Robust contractor incentives plan
in place?
- Are contractors managmg
to achieve cost
objectives?
- Tools for tradeoffs provided?
- Contractor participation in
tradeoff process?
- New technologies/mfg processes
identified/implemented to
reduce costs?
- Procedural impediments to cost
reduction identified?
- Strong vendor relationship
established?
- Sound vendor incentive structure?
Table 3.2 Monitoring and Assessing Progress [Ref. 5]
The CATV guidance is still evolving as implementation of the concept becomes
more widespread. The CATV approach to acquisition management is expected to
result in less costly products and systems with lower life cycle costs, shorter program
production, clearer and more innovative acquisition approaches and high quality
products that fully meet true requirements. [Ref. 14:p. 4]
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C. KEY ELEMENTS OF CAIV
To allow for comparisons to the DTC cost control program, the same questions
listed in chapter 2 are applied to the CAIV concept. The following questions will be
discussed in this section:
• How are CAIV targets/goals developed?
• When are targets and goals implemented?
• How are goals incorporated into contracts?
• What incentives are used to motivate government and
contractor management?
• How is the status of a CAIV program monitored?
• What happens when a program is projected not to meet
the cost goal?
• How does the CAIV goal relate to the budget?
• What organizations are involved in the CAIV process?
1. How Are CAIV Targets/Goals Developed?
The first step in the CAIV implementation process is to set aggressive cost
objectives. Whenever aggressive cost objectives are mentioned, a sentence usually
follows stating that these objectives will be much lower than previous cost goals for a
system. Historically, most major programs have experienced overruns in development
contracts and now the new cost goal is expected to be lower. In CAIV, cost refers to
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total lifecycle cost. A higher development cost may be required to obtain a lower
lifecycle cost. The cost goal must include both production and O&S cost elements.
A basic premise of CATV is that the new cost objectives will be set using
cost/performance tradeoffs. In the past, the threat was viewed as ever increasing and
systems were developed based on defeating a projected threat 5-10 years into the
future. For example, a warhead was designed to penetrate a number of inches of steel
plate that was much greater than required for existing enemy systems only because it
was projected that there might be a need in the future. Designing a system to meet a
higher performance requirement usually involves more risk than designing a system to
meet a lower requirement. The new CATV tradeoff process will evaluate risk areas in
advance and not try to attain performance requiring high risk developments if the
performance is not required.
The CATV approach to systems acquisition is described as a "business-like"
approach. [Ref 1] Industry relies on a market driven price to remain competitive. The
automobile industry and consumer electronics industries are examples where the
market ultimately determines the price that manufacturers can charge for products.
[Ref. 14:p. 8] One market driven approach to setting cost goals is sometimes referred
to as target costing. The target costing concept is defined as follows:
...a structured approach to detenriining the cost at which a proposed
product with specified functionality and quality must be produced.
Target costing differs from the... cost plus approaches found in many
firms in that the desired cost to manufacture is specified. In practice,
target costing appears to lead to products with lower costs than cost
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plus approaches. The most likely explanation for this is that
designing to a specified low cost appears to create more intense
pressure to reduce cost than designing to an unspecified low
minimum low cost. This explanation is in keeping with research on
goal setting, which finds that better performance emerges from
setting specific, challenging goals. [Ref. 16:p. 34-35]
"Target costing is a tool for aiding decisions about design specifications and
production techniques." [Ref.l7:p. 18] Target costing relies on early design tradeoffs
to ensure that a product can be manufactured for a given cost. The overall target cost
is factored into lower level targets. Designers must achieve the lower level targets
through the tradeoff process. Various studies have highlighted the fact that the
majority of a product's production and support costs are already determined early in
the design phase. Estimates range from 70% to 95%. [Ref. 18, Ref. 19]
The target costing approach still does not fully explain to a government
program manager how cost goals or targets are set. The government is usually the
only customer, or at least the first customer, for most weapon systems. There is no
real market similar to the commercial sector to use as a basis to establish a realistic
target cost. A system may receive a specific unit cost goal from a higher headquarters
authority or could develop its own goal. The DOD Guide to EPPD lists a technique
that is used by industry to perform cost/performance tradeoffs, and this could be used
to assist in establishing the original goal for the government. The IPPD Guide
describes quality function deployment (QFD) as:
a systematic process for truly understanding the user's requirements
and expectations and documenting the best approach and methods
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for satisfying these requirements. The customer at times states
requirements vaguely, and at other times too tightly, i.e. a specific
solution. The QFD process revolves around understanding what the
customer really expects and focuses efforts on satisfying these needs
through extensive trade-off analyses. QFD also provides a way of
tracking and tracing trade-offs through various levels from
requirements through design decisions to production and support
phases. [Ref 20:p. 2-5]
Bill Benzur, a QFD expert and quality management consultant, summarizes the
promise of QFD by staling, "QFD has proven incredibly useful as a tool for bringing
customer requirements into the engineering process." [Ref. 21]
The QFD technique relies on a "house of quality" (HOQ) to graphically depict
the various combinations of user requirements and technical responses. Figure 3.1
depicts a simple HOQ structure.
The "wants" represent the customer needs and benefits referred to as the
Voice of the Customer. Customer needs are not technical solutions to a problem.
The needs represent the benefit the customer requires from a solution. Examples
of customer needs include: light weight (e.g., under 50 pounds), 2000 meter range,
meeting the performance requirement, production cost under $50,000 per unit,
minimizing O&S cost, and a development schedule under 48 months.
The planning matrix includes information relating to the customer needs
and benefits. The different columns could represent importance of the "want" or
desire to the customer, how well the current system meets the need, how well the
alternatives meet the need, or importance of meeting the need to the team. The
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planning matrix should be completed as soon as possible to enable the technical



























































Figure 3.1 House of Quality Structure [Ref. 22]
The "hows" represent the technical responses, i.e., the Voice of the
Developer. The responses can take a number of forms including metrics, product
features of services, product requirements, etc. [Ref. 22:p. 72]
The relationships are represented by numerical values or descriptive
terms. A set of descriptive terms that could be used include: no relationship,
slight, moderate and strong relationship. If a column includes only weak
relationships to all the rows, the item or feature could be eliminated.
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The same techniques can be carried to lower and lower levels until the
processes and production operations are uncovered. Figure 3.2 shows the flow
down from one HOQ to the next level. As indicated in the figure, the "hows" from
the top level HOQ become the "wants" on the next level. The classical model for
QFD is shown in Table 3.3. This model allows the technical developer to
establish priorities at the different levels of the development process. As shown in

















Figure 3.2 Flowdown Between Interrelated Matrices [Ref. 22:p. 14]
MATRIX WANT HOW
House of Quality Voice of the Customer Technical Performance Parameters
Subsystem Design Matrix Technical Performance Measures Piece-Part Characteristics
Piece Part Design Matrix Piece-Part Characteristics Process Parameters
Process Design Matrix Process Parameters Production Operations
Table 3.3 Classical Model for Quality Function Deployment [Ref. 22,p. 15]
A key step in the acquisition process is the translating of requirements into
design and cost elements. The QFD approach allows the CPIPT visibility into the
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details of the design required to estimate costs. Cost estimates can be generated for
different requirements and designs. The user can then see the price to pay for a
product or system. It appears that target costing and QFD could be integrated to
provide a solid "business-like" approach to setting a DOD cost goal. Target costing
would assign costs to the different design parameters and QFD would assign value to
the design parameters based on the importance the user places on the parameter.
Integrating the two techniques would identify components or features of a system that
are costly and provide little benefit to the user. [Ref. 17:p. 18]
One technique used by industry to accurately cost products is activity based
costing (ABC). The DOD Guide to IPPD also describes ABC as a valuable technique
for cost analysis. The guide states that:
ABC focuses on the activities [e.g., initiating purchase orders,
machine set-up, machine labor hours, etc.] performed in the
realization of a product. Costs are traced from activities to products,
based on each product's consumption of such activities. The cost of
a product equals the sum of all activities performed including
overheads, capital costs, etc. [Ref. 20:p. 2-6]
The ABC technique provides the cost estimator an advantage in accuracy not available
from other techniques. Cost estimates based on ABC will accurately cost systems and
subcomponents. The cost/performance tradeoff process described earlier relies on
accurate cost estimates to ensure that the most cost effective solution to a problem is
developed. Depending on level of implementation, the QFD approach can provide
visibility into contractor subcomponents, processes and production steps or operations.
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The normal accounting procedures that defense contractors use to develop bids and
report costs can lead to inaccuarate representations of an individual product or
component cost. The normal accounting procedure is described as follows:
It is not unusual for traditional manufacturing organizations to use a
plant-wide or departmental rate to allocate the overhead costs to
products. These organizations collect the indirect manufacturing
costs incurred in a plant into a common pool and then allocate the
cost to products on the basis of direct labor hours. Although product
cost computed on such allocation fulfils the needs of external
financial reporting, it is unsatisfactory for making product-related
decisions such as product pricing...where accurate cost of individual
products is important....The traditional overhead apportionment rates
are too broad because they apportion overhead based on production
volume even when production is driven by variables other than
volume. [Ref. 23]
Figure 3.3 depicts the differences between the two approaches and is used to present a
simple example illustrating the potential estimating inaccuracies inherent in the
traditional method.
For purposes of illustration, assume that the Army is purchasing 300 new heavy
trucks. One of the user representatives decides that because 30 trucks will be located
in an area with three to four months of ice and snow, these vehicles should have an
extra set of studded snow tires. The contractor proposal states that the additional cost
per tire is only five dollars. The additional cost includes only the cost of the studs plus
applicable overhead. The actual cost under the ABC method would include the costs
of activities that resulted from the addition of the studded tires. Examples of such
activities include the extra purchase order that a contractor would have to generate and
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Figure 3.3 Comparison of Cost Accumulation Methodologies [Ref. 24]
possibly, the extra time to set up the line to produce studded tires. An additional setup
cost of $5,000 is insignificant in terms of the total overhead collected into a cost center
pool of the company. However, if the $5,000 is added to the order of 120 tires that
actually caused the increase, it becomes significant. If the $5,000 is prorated over the
120 tires, the extra cost per tire for set up alone is over $40. Rather than adding only
five dollars to the cost for the purchase of studs, the purchase of the studded snow tire
actually increases both the overhead costs and the direct costs. It is obvious from the
above example that additional alternatives should be investigated before purchasing
studded snow tires. Perhaps tire chains would be an acceptable substitute.
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Since overhead costs are usually allocated by charging a fixed rate based on
usage of labor hours or material hours, the higher volume product will absorb the bulk
of the costs. The addition of a new product or a special customized component may
not cause a visible increase in overhead rates. By using ABC, a CPIPT comprised of
both government and contractor personnel can estimate the true cost of components
and "nice to have" features. The QFD process isolates the components and features
that can be costed using ABC.
In addition to accurately estimating product costs, ABC can identify activities
that can be:
Reduced - reducing the time and effort needed to perform tasks by
using efficient procedures (e.g., replacing an expensive labor
operation with automation)
Eliminated - eliminating non-value added tasks by altering design
and procurement practices (e.g., reducing uneeded material handling
operations)
Shared - reducing the time and cost it takes to design and produce a
product (e.g., by using existing parts and standardizing components
rather than creating new ones) [Ref 25 :p. 25]
The previous section has introduced some of the techniques that businesses use
to establish cost goals. These techniques can assist in developing a bottom-up estimate
and to increase the user participation in detennining the cost goals. During the earlier
phases of the program, the goal may be specified as a range estimate, with the range
narrowing at future milestone reviews.
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The government can obtain a cost goal by development of a bottom-up estimate
as described above. Alternatively, a cost goal may be directed by higher authority. A
directed goal may result in the problem of a program facing an unrealistic goal. This
issue is discussed in Chapter IV. However, the techniques described in this section
will allow the government to determine the capability to be acquired for a directed cost
goal.
2. When Are Targets And Goals Implemented?
The DOD 5000.2-R specifies that goals are established at Milestone I. The
goals are also presented at the subsequent milestone reviews and can be adjusted and
updated.
3. How Are Goals Incorporated Into Contracts?
The government provides cost goals in the RFP for both the production phase
and the O&S phase. After a contract is awarded, contractors, subcontractors and
vendors can become a part of the cost team and play an active role in cost/performance
tradeoffs. The role of the various cost team members is discussed.
Unlike the previous cost control program, DTC, which could reference a
military standard, CATV does not have an applicable document to serve as a reference.
There is no structured or formal reporting system is required of the contractor. Each
Program Office must specify appropriate feedback mechanisms to allow sufficient
monitoring of contractor progress.
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4. What Incentives Are Used To Motivate Government And
Contractor Management?
Competition is still considered the primary incentive to motivate industry to
design and manage programs to achieve cost objectives. The government must
maintain competition to the extent possible in the development cycle, and also must
have a mechanism to restart competition in production if necessary. The contractor
should compete and incentivize subcontractors. [Ref. 5]
Source selections must emphasize not only production costs but O&S costs in
the evaluation process. In addition to competition, award or incentive fees and sharing
of cost savings should be incorporated into the contract. [Ref. 5] Various incentives
are discussed in Chapter IV.
Competition within the government also is mentioned as a technique to
incentivize both government and contractor managers. The CATV Working Group
stated that acquisition programs within the same mission area could compete for funds.
[Ref. 5] This type of competition is discussed further in Chapter IV.
The government and contractor program managers always face the possibility
of program cancellation if a cost goal can't be achieved. Incentives will be discussed
further in Chapter IV.
5. How Is The Status OfA CAIV Program Monitored?
The CPEPT is a continually functioning team and should include contractor
personnel. The team should monitor the progress toward achieving the goal and
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evaluate trade-offs that will allow realization of the goal. Programs still face the
normal milestone reviews where cost goals are presented and discussed.
6. What Happens When A Program Is Projected Not To Meet The
Cost Goal?
The government and contractor team must examine the cost/performance
tradeoffs available that may help lower the projected costs. If system performance is
above the minimum required performance and tradeoffs are available, the project
manager can authorize a design change. If there are no potential tradeoffs that allow
achievement of the minimum requirement, the government has two choices: (1) raise
the target cost, or (2) cancel the program. Either of these choices requires a higher
level headquarters review. [Ref. 14:p. 6]
7. How Does The CAIV Goal Relate To The Budget?
There is no specific guidance relating the CAIV cost goal to the budget. The
only guidance states that the program costs should be budgeted. Government cost
estimates incorporating a cost goal usually include additional risk funding. During the
early phases of a program, the goal is stated as a range, not a point estimate and some
uncertainty is expected. This area is discussed further in chapter 4.
8. What Organizations Are Involved In The CAIV Process?
The CPEPT is the main group involved in the CAIV process. An attachment to
the Kaminski Cost Performance policy letter describes the activities of the CPEPT and
lists the organizations that are represented on the team.
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The CPIPT is led by the project office representative. In addition to technical,
cost, logistics and contracting personnel from within the project office or local
command, the user, the Army and OSD staff are supposed to play a greater role in the
costing process than in the past. Representatives from both OSD Program, Evaluation
& Analysis (PA&E) (the organization that studies affordability issues and uses the
COEA) and the OSD CAIG are permanent members of the CPIPT. In addition, the
Army also will have PA&E and cost analysis representatives. This results in a rather
large group that is expected to be empowered to make decisions regarding project
costs. The CPIPT will be more active during the milestone review cycles.
/ A smaller team within the program office is to be established to work CAIV
issues on a daily basis. Different functional elements from within the program office,
the user, the contractor and other functional organizations within the command are
represented.
D) SUMMARY
Key aspects of CAIV were analyzed for comparison to the DTC cost control
policy. The CAIV concept is similar to DTC. However, differences exist in concept
and implementation that may allow programs managing costs under CAIV to succeed
in realizing cost control goals. Areas considered key to understanding the CAIV
concept are the goal setting process, incentives, contractual factors and characteristics
and responsibilities of organizations.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. OVERVIEW
Previous chapters defined the DTC and CAIV processes. The DTC and CATV
concepts are very much alike. Like CATV, the DTC concept is based on a "business-
like" approach. This approach is described in the following paragraph:
In the design, development, production and marketing of its own
commercially sold products, American industry has continuously
demonstrated a great capability to achieve new product designs
which reflect a highly sensitive balance between design, production
costs, and market potential. The Government is hoping to benefit
from this capability by emphasizing its use in weapon system
development. [Ref. 26, Pg.4]
The above paragraph is from a 1972 report by the Research and Engineering Advisory
Committee (REAC) of the National Security Industrial Association (NSIA). The
original DTC concept also attempted to leverage from successful industry practices.
The DTC program was canceled due to the overall ineffectiveness of the program.
There were some success stories so maybe the problem was not with the DTC concept
but with the implementation of the concept.
It would appear that programs implementing the CATV concept may face the
same types of problems past programs encountered implementing DTC. This is true
for some areas; however, industry approaches to cost control and goal setting have
changed as described in the previous chapter.
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This chapter will compare DTC and CAIV, describing similarities and
differences. There are key differences between DTC and CAIV, in both
conceptualization and implementation. Issues will be developed that must be
addressed for successful CAIV implementation. Problems that programs have
encountered during DTC implementation formed the basis for development of the
issues presented in this chapter. Issues are grouped into subject areas.
B. COMPARISON OF DTC AND CAIV
The key elements of DTC and CAIV are compared based on the eight areas
discussed in Chapters II and HI.
1. How Are Targets/Goals Established?
The development of a goal in the CAIV process is similar to the development
of a goal in the DTC process. Goals can be directed by higher headquarters or
estimated using cost analysis techniques. Bottoms-up engineering estimates are the
most common form of process for setting cost goals.
The DTC Joint Implementation Guide described the team approach to goal
setting. The team was formed prior to milestone I. Later, when a Project Manager
was assigned, the team usually was disbanded. The team performed the tradeoff
analyses. A big difference in the tradeoff process under DTC is the importance placed
on the three main design parameters. Under DTC, performance, schedule and cost
50
were considered equal. In actual practice, more emphasis was placed on performance
and schedule than on cost.
Early DTC guidance established only a cost goal based on unit production
costs even though lifecycle costs were supposed to be considered in the cost control
program. Only years later was a design-to-operating and support cost (DTOSC) goal
initiated. However, most programs still implemented only cost goals based on
production costs. After milestone I, cost goals were point estimates.
A team approach is also used under the CAJV concept to establish cost goals.
In this case the team approach is continued throughout development. The user and
contractor are involved in the activities of the team throughout the process. The
CATV process recommends a "business-like" approach to cost management. The
techniques that industries use to set cost targets are described in chapter 3. These
techniques offer the government a more structured approach to goal setting and the
tradeoff process. These techniques allow the emphasis to be placed on the actual cost
of a system or component throughout the process. Cost takes precedence over
performance and schedule, providing that the minimum technical requirements are
achievable.
The CATV guidance emphasizes that minimum life cycle cost is the primary
goal of the efforts. Unit cost goals include both the production phase and O&S phase.
Existing guidance recognizes the uncertainty inherent in any cost estimate and allows a
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cost goal to be implemented as a range. The percent variability in the goal decreases
as the program progresses. Figure 4.1 provides a graphical representation of the
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Figure 4.1 Cost Target Ranges [Ref. 28]
2. When Are Goals Implemented?
Both the DTC and CATV programs recognize the importance of establishing
goals early in the program lifecycle. Initial goals are established prior to milestone I
and are updated at future milestone reviews. Firm goals, represented by point
estimates, are usually set at milestone I for a program under the DTC concept and are
required by milestone II. Under the CATV concept, goals are updated at each
milestone and expressed as ranges.
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3. How Are Goals Incorporated Into Contracts?
Under the DTC program, the RFP could specify a cost goal or the contractor
could propose a goal. Goals were included as part of the demonstration/validation
phase (now PDRR) contracts. The government developed MIL STD 337 for the DTC
program which included implementation requirements and reporting requirements.
Early DTC implementation included only unit production cost goals. One of the
requirements that MIL STD 337 imposed on full scale development (now EMD)
contracts was to require goals for O&S costs.
Under the CATV concept, the government and/or contractor establish cost goals
for production and O&S. The contractor is a member of the CPEPT and has significant
input in the tradeoff analyses that are performed to attain the goal. The government
does not reference MEL STD 337 as a result of acquisition reform and instead, must
include unique reporting requirements as part of the RFP.
4. What Incentives Are Used To Motivate Government And
Contractor Managers?
Competition is considered the biggest motivational factor available to
incentivize the contractor to achieve cost objectives. The impact of competition, both
positive and negative, is discussed later in this chapter. The CATV concept also
mentions that competition within different mission areas in the DOD is possible.
Potential government competition is also discussed later in this chapter.
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Under the DTC concept, the RFP specified the relative weights that were to be
applied to cost and performance during the source selection process. The CATV
concept, in theory, places a greater importance on cost than under the DTC concept.
Source selections should also consider lifecycle cost under the CATV concept.
Lifecycle cost also was a factor under the DTC concept but was rarely a factor with
enough importance to change a program decision.
Financial incentives have been important elements of both DTC and CATV.
Incentives are discussed later in this chapter. Although rarely used, program
termination has also been considered an option for programs failing to achieve cost
goals under both cost control approaches.
5. How Is The Status Of The Program Monitored?
Cost goals are contained either directly or as lower level elements in
government program management documentation. The APB, SAR and DCP are some
of the documents that contain unit cost goals. The APB usually contains goals based
only on development and production costs.
Under the DTC program the contractor provided a formal monthly or quarterly
DTC report as required by the contract which was used to monitor progress toward
achieving the cost goal. A program initiated under the CATV concept includes
contractor representation on the CPEPT. Through the CPIPT, the program office
should always have a current status of the contractor's progress toward achieving the
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goal. Continual involvement by government and contractor in the tradeoff process
allows for a feed-forward approach to program monitoring rather than the feedback
approach dictated by the DTC reporting process.
6. What Happens When A Program Cannot Achieve A Cost Goal?
Programs operating under the DTC concept usually increased cost of the
system and the required performance of the system remained unchanged. Under DTC,
the contractor's goal specified in the contract was rarely increased and the contractor
continued to manage and report to an unachievable goal.
Program termination is one option which is available to the government when a
cost breach occurs under both cost control concepts. This option was rarely taken in
the past. The other alternatives are to increase the cost goal or to reduce the required
performance. A formal higher headquarters review is required to implement either of
these changes.
7. How Does The Cost Goal Relate To The Budget?
As DTC evolved, the process provided some guidance to relate goals to the
budget. The guidance omitted discussion of risk funding which most program
managers included in the cost estimates that were provided for budgetary purposes.
This became necessary due to the failure of programs to achieve the contracted DTC
goal. The DTC Joint Implementation Guide originally intended that the DTC goal be
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representative of the flyaway cost portion of the production budget. The O&S cost
goals were not directly related to the project manager's budget.
The CATV goal represents the cost of the particular hardware element in the
budget. The CATV process recognizes that the cost estimating is not an exact science
and as previously discussed includes range estimates for goals or at least recognizes
that a program that actually achieves a cost within 10% of a point estimate is still
considered a success. The cost target provided to the contractor may be a single
number. The program manager should request a budget that allows the most likely
actual cost to be fully funded.
8. What Organizations Are Involved In The Process?
Similar organizations are involved in the cost control process under both the
DTC and CATV concepts. The early DTC guidance stated that after milestone I and a
program manager was chosen, that the original team which included user
representation was disbanded. Cost control usually centered on the efforts of each
individual program office. The user remained involved throughout EMD, but his
focus was primarily directed toward system performance rather than cost, especially
during OT&E.
The user is involved as an active participant in the tradeoff process on a more
continuous basis under the CAIV concept. When asked about the differences between
DTC and CATV, one CPEPT member from an Army Program Office, stated the
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"biggest difference was that under the CATV concept the user is continually involved
in the tradeoff process along with the program office and contractor." [Ref. 29] The
CPIPT has the authority to make tradeoffs as long as performance does not fall below
the minimum acceptable level. The CPIPT structure and activities permit a formalized
method to continually focus on reducing costs. The DTC process usually didn't
involve a dedicated cost reduction team on a continual basis.
C. IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES
Case studies, lessons learned, reports, briefings and other written information
provide numerous examples of problems encountered by offices implementing DTC.
Published material and interviews highlighted some areas that may impact successful
CATV implementation. This section will group similar issues, describe each issue,
identify the impact and describe potential methods to minimize the impact.
1. Setting The Goal
The first group of issues result from the goal setting process. There are
difficulties estimating the costs not only of technologically advanced weapons but also
the costs of less challenging systems. Other factors, like an unrealistic schedule,
budget fluctuations, production quantities, or even competition often cause major
problems for the cost estimator. The specific issues are:
• Point estimates




• Quantity covered by goal
• O&S cost goals
a. Point Estimates
A cost goal based on a point estimate was not considered the overriding
problem. The greater problem was that under DTC the cost goal appeared locked in
concrete. This was demonstrated by the fact that a contractor's goal was not usually
updated even after it was determined unachievable. Once a goal was determined
unachievable, the DTC program became more of an after the fact reporting process.
The DTC effort involved reporting what factors caused the variance between the goal
and the current estimate.
The CATV concept recognizes that targets based on range estimates are
more achievable than targets based on point estimates. Even though a contractor may
receive a point estimate as a goal, the CPIPT process allows the goal to be updated
more easily based on changes to quantities, inflation rates, additional requirements,
etc. One of the questions that was asked of program office and cost analysis personnel
was, what type of cost goal have you experienced under CATV? Most respondents
familiar with CATV stated that the contractor's goal was a point estimate. [Ref. 29],
[Ref. 30], [Ref. 31] The CATV process allows more flexibility than the DTC process
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setting a goal. A cost specified as an allowable range or a process that recognizes the
potential inaccuracy of estimates early in development should minimize concerns in
this area.
b. Unrealistic Cost Goals
The following paragraph describes the feeling in the defense community
with respect to program costs and cost realism:
Conventional wisdom has held that cost estimates are systematically
biased (low) because of the intense competition between new
programs for resources and the competition to win new contracts.
Thus, industry is expected to underbid the true cost of the program,
and the services are expected to accept such a bid as reasonable.
[Ref. 32:p. 34]
The experience of personnel interviewed also showed this fact to be
true. Military program managers reviewing two major Army systems reduced the
original cost estimates prepared by in-house or command cost personnel prior to
presentation to the Army. Their job does require the review of these estimates and
errors should be corrected prior to submission up through the chain of command.
However, the main problem that was found with the estimates was that they appeared
too high. The cost analysis personnel then were required to go back and reduce effort
in certain areas to develop a more politically acceptable figure. As in most cases, the
original estimates for these programs were prepared by reviewing actual cost from
previous similar systems or by involving engineers from the functional areas to
estimate manhours and materials using a bottoms-up approach. The estimates that
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went forward were not consistent with actual past history or the engineer's best
estimating efforts. Costs on both programs were higher than the original estimates
causing large overruns to the presented estimates. The programs were technologically
challenging and were considered successful even after experiencing large cost and
schedule overruns.
The competition for programs and funds is also listed as one of the
issues and is discussed later in more detail.
The reduction in the defense budget may aggravate the problem of
unrealistic estimates. "As the industrial base shrinks, the surviving
companies—hungry for work—will be tempted to "buy-in" to
contracts just to keep their workforce employed." [Ref. 33 :p. 32]
Losses in the short term are acceptable to the contractor if the long term cost
impact is favorable. In the case of cost-plus type contracts, the contractor is only
giving up profit.
The use of contractor past performance in the source selection process
should lead to a reduction in underbidding in the long term. A May 1996 Report of
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Acquisition Reform stated that
contractor prior performance should receive heavy consideration during the source
selection time frame. [Ref. 34:p. B-5]
Other factors also contribute to unrealistic cost estimates. A new
program may require the development of technology that is beyond the state of the art.
Historical estimating methods and databases cannot accurately estimate this type of
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system. Somewhere along the line, the cost estimator will have to rely on a
complexity factor provided by engineering personnel to relate old system technology
to the new system. For some cost models, a small change in the factor can
significantly change the resulting cost. The CATV process can account for these
changes by allowing goals to be stated as ranges. As the system becomes more
defined, the allowable range decreases.
c. Competition
Competition, in this case, refers to the negative aspects of competition
that can impact the goal setting process. As mentioned in the previous section,
competition can cause program costs to be understated by both the government and
contractor management. This was also a problem under the DTC concept. The
phenomena was described in 1976 paper by Eugene Johnson, the manager of the
Design-to-Cost Laboratory of Boeing Aerospace Company. Figure 4.2 graphically
depicts the problem.
If the customer planning estimate, point C, refers to the earliest government
estimates, the chart is still representative of the acquisition process today. If point C
represents the estimate that is prepared for the milestone decision, experience of
persons interviewed has indicated that the negotiation process, line CD, results in a
contract award below the government estimate at point C. The situation presented by
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Figure 4.2 will remain an issue as long as the acquisition process does not develop
procedures to discourage or penalize such practices.
o
D
A - Initial Contractor Organizational Estimate
B - Contractor Corporate Decision Estimate
C - Government Planning Estimate
D - Contract Award Price
E - Final Program Cost
Time
AB - Reduction Attributable to Industrial Competition
BC - Reduction Attributable to Government In-house Competition
CD - Contract Negotiations
DE - Contract Cost Growth
Figure 4.2 Typical ProgramCost History [Ref. 34]
Unrealistic Schedule
An unrealistic schedule is considered a significant factor contributing to
cost growth in programs. In most cases, schedules are dictated from higher authorities
within the government. Both the government program manager and the contractor
manager must develop a program plan based on meeting the schedule. An unrealistic
schedule leads to program stretchout. The results of an Institute for Defense Analysis
(IDA) analysis of 89 defense department programs indicated that program stretch is a
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significant factor contributing to both production and total cost growth. [Ref. 35 :p. V-
2] The use of unrealistic production schedules is discussed further in the next section.
The need for longer, realistic schedules was recognized in the 1970s.
An NSIA Design-to-Cost panel stated:
The acquisition cycle must allow time during concept definition and
development phases for thorough trade-off analysis.... In our haste to
meet requirements timetables, we invariably take more time in the
long run to correct our mistakes and pay dearly for this, not only in
the cost to correct mistakes but in the price of the system, because
the system procured didn't have the benefit of proper trade-off
analysis. [Ref. 36:p. 2]
The DTC process required tradeoffs of cost, performance and schedule.
In most cases the schedule was provided in advance and actually could not be used in
the tradeoff process. "Schedule is paramount, and resources ~ in terms of money and
people — are planned to solve problems in an effort to hold schedule." [Ref. 37:p. 14]
This not only requires extra costs and time to correct mistakes as mentioned in the
previous paragraph but also requires additional costs throughout the development
process to attempt to maintain schedule. Parallel design efforts may be required to
enable a system to meet all internal milestones to proceed to the next step in the
development process.
The CATV process may allow a CPEPT to trade schedule versus cost.
Another factor also contributes to a willingness to allow these trades. In the past, new
systems were developed based on an urgent need. Today there is no longer the same
63
threat, and urgency of need is no longer considered an overriding factor at the OSD
level. A delay in fielding is no longer considered a valid justification to avoid a budget
cut.
There are a number of potential solutions to the schedule problem. The
government could dictate solutions to the contractor by providing a number of
different schedules that could be traded for different costs. [Ref. 38:p. 5] The
contractor could then present a proposal using the cost/schedule mix that he could
meet. Another option is described by the following paragraph;
Unrealistic schedules automatically build in problems for the
contractor. An option always ought to be open to the contractor in
the proposal phase to bid a realistic schedule without penalty (not
winning the contract) when compared to a contractor willing to say
he can make the schedule when he knows he cannot. (Look at the
history of schedules and performance against schedules). [Ref. 38:p.
15]
The use of past performance during source selection should help alleviate the
problem by awarding to contractors with a history of achieving the agreed to
schedule. Since most previous acquisitions dictated schedules, it will take a
number of years to collect the database.
e. Quantity CoveredBy Goal
The DTC process usually included the entire projected buy in the
development of a unit cost goal. The contractor's DTC plan included adjustments that
would be required to update the goal based on using the current quantity profile as a
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basis. A problem occurred every time the assumptions used by the contractor to
estimate quantity changes were not detailed enough to cover the actual change in the
quantities. Some programs experienced drastic quantity reductions of 50% or more.
Other programs maintained the originally projected quantities but the number of
production years increased significantly. The most difficult type of situation facing
cost estimators included a combination of both of the above.
Some program goals included only recurring costs. Even if the
recurring cost was adjustable based on the new profile, the assumptions used by the
program offices to calculate nonrecurring costs might have been wrong. In the past the
government usually directly paid for the facilities. If the budget was cut by 50% a
much greater reduction in quantities might have been required.
The CATV process allows goals to be based on quantities which do not
reflect the entire buy. The CATV Working Group guidance states:
Production cost objectives should be expressed in terms of some
reasonably stable measure, such as an early fixed production
quantity (e.g., the first production lot), to eliminate variations due to
future changes in the quantities planned or actually produced. (For
some programs, it may be appropriate to specify the objective in
terms of "first unit production cost.") [Ref. 5]
This should help program managers avoid complex adjustment clauses that were
common under DTC.
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/ OperatingAnd Support Cost Goals
As previously mentioned, O&S cost goals frequently were not used in
past programs. An O&S cost goal would face the same problems described above
relating to point estimates, unrealistic estimates, unrealistic schedules, competition,
etc. The O&S phase is farther out in the future and hence more uncertain. Most
programs already include goals for reliability and maintainability (R&M). The
Reliability Design Handbook prepared by the Reliability Analysis Center states:
A review of logistics support cost factors indicate that they are
driven by system R&M characteristics. For example, when
considering maintenance costs, the reliability of the system and it's
components, in terms of unscheduled maintenance frequencies and
[mean-time-between-failure] MTBF, directly impacts the frequency
of repair and/or overhaul of failed components. Also, the higher the
reliability, the lower the number of field modifications required and
the lower the cost, including retrofit. Significant R&M expenditures
during the development phase can be cost justified if improved field
R&M performance and lower operating and maintenance will result
from the R&M efforts....Defining limits for trade-off of R&M
parameters is of a critical importance. The unit production price
limits the cost of spares, the amount of built in test equipment
(BITE), and the level of functional reliability that can be designed
into the system to meet the operational availability requirement. The
operational scenario, along with the unit level reliability, defines the
expected number of system faults which will have to be serviced
within the defined ownership costs. Required system availability
further constrains reliability and establishes the maintenance and
supply considerations that will have to be designed into the system.
All these factors, and more, enter into the initial design trades if
affordable systems are to be acquired. [Ref 39:p. 284-287]
A detailed cost model is required to effectively perform cost/performance tradeoffs
and also model the impact of various reliability, maintainability, and availability values
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on the overall cost. The ideal output of such a model comparing reliability and













Figure 4.3 Relationship Between Reliability and Cost [Ref. 39:p. 289]
The chart drives home a major point. "For a given design, the cost increases (usually
exponentially) as reliability is improved." [Ref. 40 :p. 31] To increase reliability
without increasing cost requires either a simpler design or a different production
process. The chart also provides an indication of the difficulty in developing and
managing O&S cost goals. Although R&M may drive O&S cost, many factors
influence the costs and a similar tradeoff chart could be prepared for each one. The
task is many times more complex than setting and managing to achieve a production
cost goal.
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The CPIPT process includes logisticians early in the process.
Logisticians will have to ensure that R&M requirements are flowed down to the
component levels. A detailed cost model is also required to accurately model logistics
factors. The Reliability Analysis Center concluded that logistics costs are driven by
system R&M.
2. Setting Cost Goals Early In The Cycle
The second area of issues dealt with the setting of cost goals early in the
development cycle. Two areas are discussed; setting cost goals too early and setting
cost goals too late.
a. Setting Cost Goals Too Early
The design-to-cost goals must be set early where the maximum use of
tradeoffs can be made. This belief is held by most government and industry personnel,
however, the following paragraph describes the problem with setting an early goal;
DTC may result in goals being established too early. DTC forces the
program manager to commit to a DTC goal well before final
agreement on configuration and operational requirements. Hence,
the need to "sell" the program may drive DTC goals down to
unrealistic levels. The key to the success of the DTC concept is the
early determination of a specific cost goal; however, it may be
extremely difficult to maintain a goal established so early in
development. Tradeoffs are made. Test results may change the
direction of development.... Planned production rates may change....
All of these items could drastically affect a goal based on a paper
assessment. So one of the cornerstones of DTC itself represents a
significant weakness of the concept. [Ref. 35 :p. DC-3]
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Both the DTC and CATV concepts state the necessity of setting an early
goal. In both cases, goals for a system are sometimes set prior to a program falling
under a program manager. The program manager has no input in developing the
original goal or system concept. The acquisition process should allow involvement of
a program manager representative or program executive office representative early in
the process.
The CATV process mitigates the risk associated with setting an early
goal by allowing goals to be stated within a 25% band early in the program. TTie DTC
process did not use ranges and therefore resulted in many goals becoming
unachievable early in development once a design was selected.
b. Setting Cost Goals Too Late
The major problem that many DTC programs faced was implementing
the cost control program too late in the development cycle. An IDA study of 89
programs determined that DTC was not effective in controlling costs. The study found
that DTC was added too late in the process to be cost effective. The study concluded
that a DTC goal must be established early to make maximum use of the tradeoff
process. [Ref. 35:p. DC- 14] This was the most common finding among the literature
studied that related to the setting of cost goals.
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The CATV and DTC processes both have procedures and guidance in
place which requires the early setting of a goal. The DOD 5000 series (March 1996)
guidance specifies the use ofCATV principles throughout the development cycle.
3. Cost Control Program Contract Implementation
The next set of issues center on how the cost control program is implemented
in the contract. The issues described in this section include: weight placed on cost in
the RFP, implementing O&S goals in contracts, competition, and incentives.
a. Weight Placed On Cost In TheRFP
The problem in the past was the lack of importance placed on cost in the
source selection process. The emphasis placed on the parameters used to evaluate
contracts is summarized by the following comments from an Air Force General, "The
competitive environment for defense contracts has been such as to reward
innovative designs which provide for high levels of performance through
advancements in the state-of-the-art." [Ref. 36 :p. 1] An IDA study stated:
System performance is still the first priority. Traditional emphasis
on performance and schedule resulted in a relatively low priority
being given to cost. [Ref. 35 :p. IX-3]
The technical performance of a system was the most important factor in selecting a
contractor. Schedules, as discussed previously, were dictated by the government.
The cost was the end result of the dictated schedule and the required performance.
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The CATV process directs that cost play a significant role in the
acquisition process. Contracts should be awarded based on meeting required
performance at a minimum cost. In many cases all the contractors that bid are
technically capable and cost may prove to be the deciding factor. Selections should
emphasize getting the "most bang for the buck" and not just the most bang. Best value
is a term used to describe the new acquisition approach.
b. Implementing O&S Goals In Contracts
Some of the problems encountered in implementing O&S goals into
contracts were previously discussed. A complex model is required to accurately
estimate costs. The following paragraph summarizes some of the problems
encountered modeling O&S costs:
The prime reasons why this relationship between production,
operating and support costs is so difficult to handle are centered in
the lack of uniform definitions and cost accumulation systems which
can effectively estimate future operating and support costs. The best
way to handle this problem at the present appears to be the use of
performance parameters such as meantime(sic)-between-failure,
meantime-to-repair, maintenance-manhours-per-operating-hour, or
mamtenance-tum-around-rime-per-mission. [Ref. 41:p. 10]
The previous discussion of O&S indicates that R&M drives most O&S
costs and is a valid starting point to implement an O&S goal. The parameters
described by the preceding paragraph are all more understandable and measurable than
cost elements and relationships. By intensively managing and incentivizing O&S
parameters, lifecycle costs can be reduced.
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c. Competition
Competition as described in this section, relates to the impact of
competition on the cost control process. The following paragraph highlights the
findings relating to competition:
Preferably two contractors should be continued through development
unless the particular system is so large and the number to be
produced so small that the cost of continuing competition through
this phase is considered unwarranted. The obvious and extremely
important advantage of continuing competition through this phase is
that it permits final selection for production to be made when the
facts are really known... .This approaches also eliminates or
substantially reduces the motivation for contractors to buy-in in the
development phase because of the lack of assurance of winning the
production follow-on. It also provides strong motivation during
development to achieve the lowest possible production price. [Ref.
36:p. 2]
In an earlier section, the tendency of contractors to buy-in was one of
the causes of unrealistic estimates and goals. The above approach really would not
reduce the tendency to buy-in unless the program uses other incentives. Incentives are
discussed later, however, the use of past performance as a source selection criteria
should help minimize the buy-in tendency. Mamtaining two contractors throughout
development is considered too costly for many programs.
Competition in earlier phases of development also has positive impacts
on a program. Competition at that point [during design and development] has the
advantage of allowing the exploration of different alternatives. [Ref. 35 :p. VII- 1]
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Early competition may allow the program manager to achieve the maximum
effectiveness from the use of the tradeoff process.
Competition must also be looked at from the standpoint of
government/industry teams. A "business-like" approach to acquisition, recommended
by higher headquarters does not rely on the constant threat of competition. One of the
problems implementing competition in today's acquisition environment is discussed
below:
There may be long-term weaknesses of competition with respect to
the relationships between industry and the Department of Defense,
but little attention has been paid these issues. Are the benefits of
competition a one time effect, or can they be sustained over time?
Production competition in major systems must be viewed as an
investment decision. [Ref. 35:p. V-II-3]
One Army program office developed an acquisition approach that
allows the program manager to develop a long term relationship with the contractor,
using a sole source contract, but still mamtaining the threat of competition. The
JAVELIN Project Office developed a cost reduction plan (CRP) as a formal agreement
between the contractor and the program office. The CRP was signed by the Army
Acquisition Executive (AAE) and high levels of contractor management. The program
office established a cost estimate based on the savings that might be obtained from
competing the two partners of the Joint Venture. Contract cost goals were established
for each year in the production program. The contractor was provided the estimated
funding available each year for hardware and services. The contractor could achieve
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the savings required to meet the funding levels through acquisition reform initiatives
and other "business-like" techniques. As long as the contractor's production proposal
was negotiated below the cost curve, there would not be competition. The first three
years were signed at or below the curve.
OSD also agreed to the CRP by signing the Program Baseline document
which incorporated the CRP cost profile. The CRP has an underlying assumption that
the program would receive its full budgeted amount. The CRP was also used
successfully to defend the program from adverse Program Budget Decisions (PBD).
The CRP provided a difficult but realistic yearly cost goal, ensured
management support and emphasis, included producibility enhancements to reduce
production and O&S costs, and enhanced contractor and government teamwork. The
signed agreement listed assumptions and ground rules which formed the basis of the
government and contractor cost estimates.
As long as the contractor's yearly proposal or negotiated cost was below
the costs specified in the CRP, the program remained sole source. This approach
required some significant changes to the normal government/contractor relationship
and to the way the Army conducted source selections. The positive benefits of
competition and government/contractor teamwork are both achieved.
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History shows that the threat of competition can achieve the same
benefits of competition. The following example from the HARM program attests to
this fact.
In the HARM program, lower prices from the threat of competition
resulted in a decision not to dual source. Incumbent, Texas
Instruments dropped its price by $209 million for the period
FY1983-85 and by $1.2 billion for the period FY1983-89 in order to
stay sole source. [Ref 35 :p. VII-5]
The new acquisition environment outlines another approach to
competition. A Defense Science Board Task Force stated:
We recommend maintaining alternate solutions to mission needs
among supplier agencies as well as among contractors, with
continuing participation and evaluation by users. It must be
emphasized that we are proposing a broader form of competition
than two firms building the same product. Competition could be
among different solutions to the same problem including current
system upgrades versus next generation systems. [Ref. 42 :p. ii]
This type of competition can involve the Services competing against one
another to provide support. The approach recommends mamtaining the possibility of
competition throughout the product development cycle. Competing based on mission
needs is discussed further in Chapter V.
cL Incentives
Contract incentives in EMD and production were associated with lower
cost growth. [Ref. 35 :p. V-7] This is the same result found by other studies. The IDA
study explained that the incentive clause can be used effectively with the DTC
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program. The incentive was the "enforcer" of the DTC provision in the contract. As
an example, IDA found on the F/A-18 program, the DTC program was taken more
seriously than on other programs. Other programs placed little emphasis on DTC.
[Ref. 35:p. XI-2]
The amount of the incentive is also an important factor in deterrnining
whether or not a contractor will meet cost goals. A GAO study reviewed 62 fixed
price incentive contracts from the 1977 to 1984 time period. The study results
indicated:
The GAO found a clustering of final prices close to the target price
and an increasing tendency for final prices to underrun the target
price as the contractor share ratios were increased. Overall findings
were that final contract costs and price seemed unrelated to the
sharing ratio. [Ref. 35 :p. XI-3]
Based on the results of the GAO study, guidelines can be developed to assist in
developing an incentive arrangement. The following guidance is provided:
Consider large profit incentives (20-25%) during the development
phase with the incentive tied to the achievement of production price
and life cycle cost factors stated in the specification. These
incentives will be more than recovered during the production phase
and would be a very strong motivation to industry management.
[Ref. 36:p. 3]
Many of the factors discussed throughout this chapter require additional
development funding. The OSD also recognizes the possibility of development costs
increasing, with savings achieved in the production and O&S areas.
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e. Development Contract Type
It was generally agreed in most of the literature on contract type that,
"cost type contracts should be used to the maximum extent possible during concept
definition and development phases. Fixed price contracts motivate against good trade-
off analyses." [Ref. 36:p. 2] Fixed price development contracts encourage the
contractor to rninimize costs on the current contract and not look at future costs.
4. Budget Instability
The instability of the federal government budget process leads to an
inefficient use of resources within the DOD. Budgets are planned based on a long
period of time. However, Congress appropriates funding on a yearly basis. Then,
both OSD and military departments and the Service can withhold or reprogram a
certain percentage of the funds. The individual program rarely receives the
amount of funding that it anticipated based on the previous year's budget estimate.
This chapter discusses three areas: (1) the direct impact of budget instability , (2)
the indirect impact, and (3) the Congressional impact.
a. Direct Impact
In "Affording Defense", Gansler describes the typical Service
approach to managing a budget reduction. The author states:
The Service... starts off assuming that a certain number of dollars will
be available with which to produce certain quantities of various
weapon systems. Then, typically, the total obligational authority is
reduced ~ often by the President first, then by Congress. The proper
way to handle such a budget cut, in order to maintain the efficiency
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of the remaining programs, would be to assign priorities and then to
defer or cancel enough lower priority programs that the cuts could be
absorbed. Historically, both the DOD and Congress have been
reluctant to cancel programs; the approach has been simply to buy
fewer units of each system "this year" and to stretch out all
programs, hoping to purchase the rest of the units in later years.
[Ref. 43 :p. 122-123]
Previous sections described the cost implications of stretching out
programs. The impact on production costs is widely known and discussed in
literature. The impact of budget cuts on the development program has an obvious
result of potentially stretching development, but also reduces the funding available for
tradeoffs. Both the DTC and CATV concepts require early tradeoff analyses to
minimize downstream production and O&S costs.
b. Indirect Impact
A fluctuating budget and yearly appropriation of funds cause other
impacts that are hard to measure. The following paragraph from an Executive
Research Project reveals the impact of the problem.
T.A. Wilson, former Boeing Chairman of the Board, [in a]
presentation to the President's Blue Ribbon Panel in 1986 compared
commercial practices to military procurements. He stated that
Boeing often commits hundreds of millions of dollars in training and
long lead high productivity machinery two or more years before go
ahead. "The message being emphasized in these remarks was that
the uncertainty of government programs constituted a major
deterrent to similar anticipation of capital investment and training in
support of defense production. " In other words, with the short one
year planning cycle in the federal budget cycle, significant company
investments in technology to improve the process are not
encouraged. Short term budget horizons will continue to foster
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business as usual attitudes in military aircraft development. [Ref.
37:p. 25]
This statement indicates that even by adopting a "business-like" approach to
acquisition, short planning cycles will cause the government not to achieve the
efficiencies realized in the private sector. The DOD can alleviate some of the problem
by entering into multiyear contracts. A multiyear contract type is usually not
implemented until a program is in full rate production. The investment that Wilson
describes occurs well before that time period.
c Congressional Impact
Congress can either directly or indirectly impact a program. The
impacts described above may be attributed to Congress. However, congressional
impact is listed as a separate category to emphasize the substantial effect Congress has
on programs.
The following statement from a study on DOD weapon system cost
growth summarizes the findings of most research. "The budgetary process isn't a strict
exercise in efficient resource allocations. Many decisions are based on political
considerations vice strict resource allocations considerations." [Ref. 33 :p. 32] Some
authors were more specific and narrowed the cause of the problem to a specific group
in Congress. "The Congressional Majority Party has a significant impact on cost and
schedule growth." [Ref. 44:p. 4]
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Another disturbing finding is that as DOD increases the use of
commercial practices, Congress has increased program oversight. [Ref. 37:p. 3]
Congressional micromanagement requires program managers to spend more time
defending and justifying their programs. More time spent preparing responses and
briefings to Congress allows less time for actually managing the acquisition program.
Unless the CATV program can adapt procedures to minimize the impact
that unstable budgets have on the acquisition process, cost control and reduction will
be difficult. Previously, the CRP was mentioned as one device that could help
establish a longer term relationship with the contractor while also mamtaining the
control and accountability required by Congress and the General Accounting Office
(GAO).
5. Management Issues
A number of factors may cause failure to achieve a cost goal. Previous
sections described the tendency of programs to understate initial costs. Of course,
this leads to cost overruns. However, even programs with a realistic cost goal may
often fail to achieve the desired results. This section discusses areas all of which
contribute to the inability of a program to achieve the cost goals: management
support, flexibility, unnecessary requirements and lack of communication.
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a. Management Support
Previous studies indicated that without top management support, a
DTC program cannot achieve the expected results. A paper by the National
Security Industrial Association Research & Engineering Avisory Committee, titled
"How to Motivate Teams to Design to a Cost", found a correlation between
management support and DTC program success. It states: "The degree of success
that can result from a Design-to-Cost program is heavily dependent on the degree
of management support given the program." [Ref. 38:p. 3] Other research also
supports this finding. A study conducted on the Navy F/A-18 Program concluded,
"The contractor did not perceive the Navy as placing sufficient emphasis on DTC."
[Ref. 45:Vol. 1, p. E-6/7] If the Service does not place sufficient emphasis on cost
control, neither will the contractor. The contractor will place emphasis on the program
elements that the customer considers important.
A 1989 IDA study developed the following conclusions regarding DTC:
• In most programs, the DTC goal was not followed through to
completion. It either was dropped or faded away in program EMD.
• DTC has been used mainly as a cost-monitoring device in EMD rather
than as a tool for making tradeoffs earlier in the process.
• There has been an absence of continued technical evaluation of
design/effectiveness/cost tradeoffs earlier in the process.
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• Use of data and feedback on DTC has not been sufficient to encourage
contractor emphasis on DTC programs. [Ref. 35:p. EX-3-13]
Lack of emphasis on the application of DTC by the government is a common
thread linking the above conclusions. The CAIV concept will face similar results
without proper emphasis. As discussed in the last chapter, the "business-like"
approach using QFD, strives to place emphasis on program elements that are
considered important to the customer.
b. Flexibility
The CAIV concept requires flexibility in the system to allow the
contractor/government teams to recommend cost/performance tradeoffs.
The DTC concept also mentioned flexibility as one of the key features required for
successful implementation. The 1983 Joint Design-to-Cost Guide characterized the
need for flexibility as follows:
The PM and each competing contractor must have maximum
freedom to provide their version of the best possible design to
perform the mission at the established cost goal. This requires that
the unit production cost goal be related to...only the minimum
number of essential performance requirements (speed, range,
payload, etc.). This will allow the PM and contractor the flexibility
needed to make tradeoffs among cost, schedule and performance
(including maintainability and reliability). [Ref. 47]
The Joint DTC guide went one step further in describing the latitude
that contractors should have to enable them to achieve cost goals. The guide stated
that contracts should be structured to allow the contractor to recommend the deletion
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of performance requirements and specifications if they are proven to have no value
added. [Ref. 47 :p. 49] The number and detail of specifications actually increased
over the years. Acquisition reform guidance provides a mechanism to reduce the
specifications which is a requirement to fully implement the cost control program.
Other guidance from the seventies stated that the government should
provide ranges of acceptable performance characteristics and schedules to the
contractor. The contractor can then trade cost for performance or schedule. [Ref.
38:p. 5]
Another finding from a study of the F/A-18 program was that ,"the
contractor did not perceive the Navy as being willing to trade other system parameters,
for example, performance for cost." [Ref. 45:Vol. l,p. E-6/7] If the schedule and
performance were fixed, cost was the only element that could vary. Costs generally
increased, not decreased. Under the CATV approach, the CPIPT actively monitors and
performs tradeoff analyses. One person interviewed in an Army program office stated
that the program office, contractor and user were all involved as team members on a
continuous basis to implement CATV. The user was willing to tradeoff performance to
achieve the cost goal. [Ref. 46]
Current ideas from industry suggest a process to ensure that cost goals
are achieved by making cost fixed and varying the other parameters. The Defense
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Science Board called this a fixed price, variable performance contract. Performance
can be lowered to achieve the cost goal.
c Unnecessary Requirements
The previous section discussed flexibility as a key requirement for a
CATV program. Industry always mentions unnecessary requirements as another key
contributor to cost growth. The following paragraph identifies this problem:
Implementation of CAIV will solve only part of the problem
associated with increasing program costs. Acquisition reform has
helped enable cost reductions in other areas. The other areas of
acquisition which must be addressed include mission requirements,
performance specifications, reliability and maintainability
requirements, testing programs, documentation, etc. These areas are
not under the control of the contractor's design engineers. [Ref. 38:p.
1]
The use of detailed design specifications to describe weapon systems
and components was one of the problems encountered by programs implementing
DTC. Dr. Foster stated, "In my opinion one of the most significant causes of high cost
designs are performance specifications which dictate high cost solutions." [Ref. 6:p.
17] Acquisition reform has eliminated the problem of programs dictating hundreds of
detailed specifications during the development process.
The problem of overstating required performance could still surface.
User participation in the CPIPT and new cost estimating methodologies that allow the
estimation of the cost of increased performance will help to control this problem. The
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QFD process can help the CPIPT to separate mandatory requirements from "nice to
have" features.
d. Communication
Poor communication between contractor and government personnel is a
recurring problem in the defense environment. Acquisition reform and the CATV
process have reduced the problem. The communication problem has always existed.
Under the DTC concept, lack of communication was identified as an area with the
potential to greatly impact the effectiveness of the cost control program.
The Design-to-Cost panel stated, "Any practice that prevents
information on expected costs from being honestly and openly transmitted
between the military Services and contractors will tend to defeat the Design-To-
Cost process." [Ref 38:p. 3] At the time this was considered a departure from normal
operating procedures. Procurement related cost information was never exchanged
with the contractor. Federal acquisition regulations still prohibit certain costs from
being discussed with the contractor. The Army CRP procedures described earlier in
the chapter involve direct discussion with the contractor regarding anticipated
contractor funding levels and costs. Implementation of the CRP requires the open
exchange of the government's estimated costs. This is certainly a departure from the
past way of doing business.
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The tradeoff process requires communications with the contractor to
enact changes in a quick and efficient manner. The CPIPT accommodates this
requirement by including the contractor as a member of the team. A proactive CPIPT
should also alleviate the perception on the part of the contractor that the government
does not consider the cost control program important.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the issues developed from study of past programs and
from personal structured interviews. A summary of the issues is listed below:
Using a point estimate to represent a goal
Establishing an unrealistic cost goal
Negative impacts of competition
Establishing an unrealistic schedule
Basing the goal on the entire buy
Establishment of an O&S goal
Setting goals too early
Setting goals too late
Weight placed on cost in RFP
Implementing O&S goals in contracts




Direct impacts of budget instability
Indirect impact ofbudget instability





The CAIY concept minimizes or eliminates the impacts caused by some of the
issues on program management efficiency. Other issues may still be problems for
program managers trying to establish a cost control program based on the CATV
concept. The next chapter provides recommendations for program managers to tackle
issues not directly mitigated by the CATV approach to cost control.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The CATV concept is similar to the DTC concept. In most cases, DTC was not
implemented as the guidance intended. Much of the failure of the DTC program may
be attributed to the poor implementation and the lack of emphasis on cost control by
managers in the past. Previously, performance was the main criterion used to select a
contractor and cost was shaped by all the other programmatic decisions.
At its inception, DTC was based on a "business-like" approach; since then,
industry tools and techniques for cost estimating and performing tradeoffs have been
refined. Today, the acquisition environment provides significant advantages to the
program manager implementing the CATV concept. Designs are no longer controlled
by detailed specifications and tradeoffs are possible. If management provides the
required emphasis on cost control, the expected results of CATV should be achieved.
However, without management support, CATV will face the same fate as DTC.
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What challenges will be faced by the Services in implementing the CAIV
concept on new systems? The short answer is that there are a number of issues. These
are addressed in answering the subsidiary questions below.
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2. Subsidiary Questions
The following subsidiary questions addressed the primary research
question:
• What is the difference between CAIV and the DTC program
required in the past to control and manage program costs?
• What advantage does the CAIV concept outlined in the updated DOD
5000 series documents offer the Services?
• What systems can be used as benchmarks for CAIV implementation?
• What issues will program managers face in implementing CAIV?
• What recommendations can be offered to program managers to best
address problematic CAIV issues?
a. What Is The Difference Between CAIVAnd The DTC
Program Required In The Past To Control And Manage
Program Costs?
There were several differences between the CAIV and the DTC
program. These differences may enable a program manager to use CAIV to
successfully control costs on a program. The notable differences are in the
following areas: (1) the emphasis placed on cost during the development process,
(2) the goal setting process, (3) the flexibility provided managers, (4) management
support and (5) communications between government and contractor.
90
Performance and schedule now are dependent on cost. In the past,
the three parameters, cost, schedule and performance were considered equal.
However, the schedule was generally provided. Very challenging performance
requirements also were stated. Cost could only become the end result of the
process. The stringent requirements did not give the government and contractor
the latitude required to perform cost tradeoffs. The CAIV process provides an
available tradeoff space. Under acquisition reform, performance goals are stated
as ranges and schedules are event driven.
The goal setting process has also changed to allow CAIV to generate
more realistic cost goals. Goals may still be directed from higher level
headquarters, based on costs of previous systems and estimated using established
cost analysis techniques. The CAIV guidance suggests the cost analyst apply
techniques used by industry to estimate costs in a competitive environment,
including target costing, ABC and QFD. These techniques were not formalized
during the period DTC was implemented.
The CAIV process also recognizes that there are many unknowns
early in the development phase, and therefore, allows goals to be stated as ranges.
The range of the goal would narrow as the program progresses. Goals stated as
ranges also provide the program manager an available tradeoff space to better
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determine the combination of cost, schedule and performance that provides the
"best bang for the buck."
The DTC process usually fixed performance and schedule and only
cost could vary. As a result, costs basically could move in only one direction: up.
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, CAIV provides a flexible framework in
which to perform tradeoffs. The user and developer must be active participants
throughout the tradeoff process.
Management also appears more receptive to the CAIV process. Pilot
programs implementing CAIV appear to have full support to test out the process.
The new DOD 5000 series documents require that CAIV is a consideration during
the milestone review process for all future programs.
The CAIV process also provides for enhanced communications
between the program management office, the contractor and the user. A CPIPT
approach to cost management and control provides immediate feedback to both the
contractor and government. No longer are the communications hampered by
delays waiting for correspondence between parties.
b. What Advantage Does The CAIVConcept Outlined In The
UpdatedDOD 5000 Series Documents Offer The Services?
The advantages of the CAIV concept he in the differences between the
DTC and CAIV programs discussed above. The CAIV approach provides a
mechanism to set a more realistic cost goal, directs that cost not become the output of
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the design process, provides for more flexibility in the process, and opens
communication lines between the government and contractor.
The new DOD 5000 series documents include acquisition reform
initiatives that provide tradeoff opportunities to managers. Previously the design of
most components and processes was dictated by detailed specifications, severely
limiting the potential for tradeoffs.
Early interpretations of CATV guidance also suggest a powerful
incentive for Services to manage costs. Under DTC some managers knew they were
"the only game in town." The program was "required" at almost any cost. CATV
guidance infers that competition between Services and within mission areas may be
required to control programs. If Service managers faced the proposition of losing their
programs to another Service, cost control would become a greater concern of
managers. Lack of management support was cited as one of the reasons that DTC
failed as a cost control program.
c What Systems Can Be UsedAs Benchmarks For CAIV
Implementation ?
There is little history available to analyze the potential success or failure
of CATV. In early CATV correspondence, OSD requested that the Services nominate
programs to become "flagship" programs. The current systems that serve as "flagship"
programs for CAIV implementation include: ATACMS/BAT P3I, Crusader, AIM-9X,
MDS, SBIRS, JASSM and JAST. The CAIV concept is new and the implementation
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is only in the early phases. A number of years may be required before CAIY results
are known. Several program managers from programs not designated as "flagship"
programs also provided examples of dollar savings generated by the CAIY approach.
However, the same managers also were unclear on what CAJV was or how it was
supposed to work. This lack of understanding can only reduce the chances for CATV
to succeed.
d. What Issues Will Program Managers Face In Implementing
CAIV?
The following issues facing managers were identified and discussed by
category in Chapter IV:
• Setting the Goal
Using a point estimate to represent a goal
Estabhshing an unrealistic cost goal
Negative impacts of competition
Estabhshing an unrealistic schedule
Basing the goal on the entire buy
Estabhshing an O&S goal
Setting Goals Early in the Cycle
•• Setting goals too early









Placing weight on cost in RFP
Implementing O&S goals in contracts
Contract incentives
Positive Impacts of Competition
Development contract type
Budget Instability
Direct impacts of budget instability
Indirect impact of budget instability






e. What Recommendations Can Be Offered To Program Managers To
Best Address Problematic CAIVIssues?
Several areas are key to successful CAIV implementation. Setting
realistic cost goals, management support and communications are areas directly under
the control of the program manager. Today's "business-like" environment emphasizes
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the government/contractor team as opposed to the often adversarial relationship
between the government and contractors in the past. CATV also stresses that
competition is one of the best techniques to control program cost. In the past
competition was also one of the causes of cost growth by encouraging understated
bids. The emphasis on past performance in the source selection process and the
possibility that a Service manager may lose the program to another Service should
rninimize understating of costs. Now not only the contractor but also the government
may face competition.
The CRP was discussed in Chapter IV. The CRP allowed the
JAVELIN Project Office to receive the benefits of both competition and
government/contractor teamwork. The CRP established difficult but realistic yearly
cost goals and ensured management support and emphasis. The cost goals were a
target for both contractor and government managers. Once the goal was established
government/contractor teams focused attention on reducing costs to achieve the goals.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
As described in the last subsidiary research question (subparagraph d, above), it
is recommended that programs implement CATV based on a formal agreement with the
contractor. The user should also sign the agreement. This agreement should foster the
teamwork required in today's environment and could also help niinimize the impact of
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external program inhibitors, and perhaps improve relations with Congress over the
acquisition budget.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There are a number of areas of research that would benefit program managers.
Areas include defining better cost estimating techniques, monitoring the CATV
program, case histories or lessons learned and further guidance on the subject of
mission area competitions.
1. Defining Better Cost Estimating Techniques
Managers would benefit from further guidance explaining the techniques that
industries use to establish cost goals and perform tradeoffs. Detailed examples from
industry, describing the QFD approach should be prepared as a lessons learned or an
implementation guidebook.
2. Monitoring The CAIV Program
The actual monitoring of CATV implementation, including metrics was not
discussed in this thesis. As more programs implement CATV, procedures and
guidelines will be required to enable managers to track program progress. The
JAVELIN CRP process included procedures for tracking progress and may serve as a
tool for further research.
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3. Case Histories Or Lessons Learned
As "flagship" programs implement and manage CATV, resulting case studies
may prove beneficial to future managers. This thesis developed implementation issues
based on comparison to the DTC program. Actual case studies could provide lessons
learned and develop issues that may differ from the problems anticipated here.
4. Mission Area Competitions
Mission area competitions or competitions between Services is a new approach
to competition. The Service leaders must better understand the implications this type
of competition might have on their programs. A Service may lose a program to
another Service. A further step would be to investigate whether the current budgetary
process could actually accommodate this type of competition and still be effective in
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